ESSAYS, OR DISCOURSES,

SELECTED FROM

THE WORKS OF FEYJOO,

AND

TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH,

BY

JOHN BRETT, ESQ.

VOLUME THE SECOND.

LONDON:

Printed for the Translator:

Sold by H. PAYNE, Pall-Mall; C. DILLY, in the Poultry; and T. EVANS, in the Strand.

MDCCLXXX.

[Pg iii]

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME

[Pg 1]

THE BALANCE OF ASTREA; OR, Upright Administration of Justice:

In a Letter from an Old Judge, to his Son who was newly raised to the Bench.

SECT. I.

I. I do not know, my Son, whether to congratulate or condole with you on the information you give me, of his Majesty having honoured you with a Judge’s robe. I contemplate you as placed in a state of slavery, which, although it is an honourable one, must always remain and continue a slavery. Already you are neither mine nor your own, but belong to the public at large. The obligations of this charge should not only emancipate you from your father, but detach you[Pg 2] from yourself also. There is an end of your considering your convenience, your health, or your ease; and you have only now to attend to the duties and discharge of your conscience; you should look upon your own good as a foreign concern, and regard that of the public as your own. You are already divested of neighbours, friends, or kindred; you have no country, and must have no regard for the tyes of flesh and blood. Do you think I mean to say, you should cease to be a man? No, certainly; but I would have it understood, that the affections of the man should

live in such a state of separation from the duties of the Judge, that there should not be the slightest commerce or correspondence between them.

II. I repeat again, that I am at a loss whether to condole with or congratulate you on the event. I view your soul as exposed to the continual hazard of being lost; and I was on the point of saying, the office of a Judge affords proximate occasions for sinning through the course of a man’s life. You may say this is a hard proposition; and I acknowledge it is; but what other inference can be drawn from the terrible sentence of St. John Chrysostom, which is in the following words: It appears to me impossible that any of those who govern should be saved. And what other thing could the[Pg 3] religious Pontiff, Pius the Vth, mean, when he said, that while he was a private Religious, he had great hopes of being saved, though when they made him a Cardinal he began to fear, but when they made him a Pope he almost despaired of salvation? If this is not a virtual asseveration, that the occupation of a ruler furnishes a continual and proximate occasion for sinning, I do not understand the expression. But it is true, that although this should be the case, the crime would be obviated, because

the necessity of the public makes the exercise of such a function inevitable; but then the crime would only be obviated in such subjects, who feel in themselves, dispositions to perform the duties of such an office with rectitude and propriety; as for the others, I will not exculpate them. I do not understand that text of the Ecclesiastes as an advice or caution, but as a precept and injunction, which says, Don’t solicit to be made a judge, unless you find yourself possessed with that virtue and fortitude, which is necessary to extirpate evil deeds.

III. He who doubts whether he is endued with a sufficient share of knowledge, or a necessary portion of health and constitution, to undertake so weighty a charge; he who does not find himself possessed of a robust heart, which is invincible to, and proof against the promises and threats of the[Pg 4] great and powerful; he who feels himself enamoured with the beauty of gold; he who knows his sensibility liable to be wrought upon by the intreaties of domestics, friends, or relations, cannot, in my opinion, enter upon the office of a magistrate with a good conscience. I do not, although it is indispensably necessary, comprehend in this catalogue of requisites the virtue of prudence, because every one fancies he possesses it; but, if a man mistakes in this particular, I judge his error to be incurable.

IV. He who is cloathed with a robe, ought to keep his soul well fortified at all points, because in a variety of occurrences, there is no passion that may not be inimical to justice; and the suitors are very solicitous in examining where the defence is weak; even lawful affections are sometimes hostile to her. What is more right or proper than a man’s tenderness for his wife? But how often has a man’s affection for his wife, been the cause of warping the wand of justice!

V. I don’t mean to inculcate, that a judge should be fierce, unfeeling, and harsh; but that he should be firm, spirited, and a man of integrity. It is rare, but not impossible, for a man to possess a soul of wax for the duties of private life, and a mind of brass for the administration of public[Pg 5] ones; although the heart may be susceptible of its tendernesses, the sacred castle of justice should be inaccessible to such feelings. It is said, that friendships may be permitted to approach even to the altar; but they should not be so much as suffered to enter the doors of the temple of Astrea.

VI. I contemplate you, my Son, as having some advantageous dispositions for exercising this office; you are disinterested, an important quality in a judge; but that does not quiet my fears; for how can I be certain you will continue so in future? Disinterestedness, like beauty, is an endowment and ornament of youth, and rarely accompanies life in old age. I have read but of two women who preserved their beauty till seventy; the one was Diana of Poitiers, Dutchess of Valentine, who lived in the reign of Henry the IId. King of France; the other was Aspasia of Miletus, concubine of Cyrus King of Persia. I do not know whether you can reckon many more men, who left totally to their natural dispositions, without the invention or assistance of other helps, preserved their contempt for gold till they arrived at that age. The soul fades with the body, and the narrowness and contractions of avarice are its wrinkles.

[Pg 6]

VII. The danger of people in exalted stations in the law, falling into this vice, is greater, because they are exposed to more frequent temptations. Elizabeth of England used to say, that the office of a Judge at his first elevation, seemed to fit on him like new cloaths, which appear tight and strait at the beginning, but after a little time they stretch and become easy and familiar. The same may be said of Judges in all other kingdoms. Many, who at first scruple to accept an apple, in the course of a few years, are capable of swallowing the whole orchard of the Hesperides; and you know the apples of that orchard were golden ones. The same thing happens to them that happens to rivulets, which rarely fall into, and are swallowed by the sea, with the scanty stock they contained in their first passages.

VIII. Let no caution, my Son, appear too great, to guard you against the treacherous attacks of avarice; this serpent, whose bulk in time increases without limits, is at first no bigger than a hair; I mean to say, they commonly begin with presents of such trifling value, that the refusing to accept them would be blamed by the world as affected nicety. But what follows? Why, that when they are once admitted, by the exertion of their power in the first entrances of the door of the will, they proceed to widen it by little and[Pg 7] little, so that every day it becomes capable of receiving more and more. God defend us from a magistrate’s setting about to enrich himself! because in such a case, he may be compared to the element of water, whose stock bears proportion to the contribution it receives; while it is a brook, it only receives fountains; afterwards becoming a river, it receives brooks; and when it arrives at being a sea, it receives rivers.

IX. It is not sufficient that you keep your own hands clean; but it is also necessary that you examine those of your domestics. The integrity of a magistrate requires, that he should adopt the practice of an active and vigilant matron, who not only takes care of the cleanliness of her own person, but looks also to the cleanliness of the rest of her household. This is not only an obligation you owe to your conscience, but is likewise a matter that concerns your reputation, because it is generally understood, that the inferior part of the family is a subterraneous conduit-pipe, through which, supplies are conveyed to the hand of the master; but in truth it happens in point of regale or refreshment, as it happened to the fountain of Arethusa, which although it was received by a cavern in Greece, the place it fertilized was the land of Sicily. We read in Daniel, that the ministers of the temple are the dainties which were presented[Pg 8] to the idol; in the house of a magistrate, the idol eats the dainties which are presented to his ministers.

X. The apprehensions I am under, that you may one day be betrayed into this corruption, move me at present to give you an excellent caution, as a preservative against the temptation of gifts, which is, that you should consider any one who attempts to gain your favour in this way, as a person who offers a direct affront to your honour; for it is clear, that by such an action, he gives it to be understood, that you hold in your hands the scales of venal justice. There are two sorts of people in the world, who fall into the dangerous error, of mistaking injuries for courtesies; women who receive presents from gallants, and ministers of justice who permit the reception of them from suitors: for with respect to the givers, every present is meant as a subornation; otherwise, why is not their liberality manifested to other people as well as to those from whom they entertain expectations? It can only be, because they consider what they give as an offering made to their interest; and that, to which they affect giving the appearance of

a courtesy, is at bottom nothing better than a bribe. He who makes presents to a lady, or a minister of justice, attempts their corruption by the act, and in his imagination supposes he has effected it. You ought, therefore,[Pg 9] my Son, to consider every one who attempts to gain your favour by such means, as an enemy to your conscience, and as a person dangerous to, and one who would injure your honour; and you should look upon him as a man, more deserving of your contempt and indignation, than your courtesy.

XI. I have given the name of preservative to the foregoing reflection, because it is rather calculated to prevent the infection from getting footing in those, who are sound and in health, than to cure the disease, after it has once taken root. He who has contracted a habit of gorging himself with presents, is callous to the reproach of having put his decisions to sale.

XII. I am inclined to think, Spain is more free from this pestilence than other kingdoms; at least in ministers of your class, this meanness has rarely been observed. It has ever been remarked, that with us, the higher people have been raised on the seats of justice, they have seemed the further removed from the baseness of avarice.

XIII. Would to God, our tribunals were as deaf to recommendations, as they are untainted with bribes! It is on this side, their credit is most tarnished in the public opinion. There is scarce a sentence given in a civil controversy, which the[Pg 10] malice of grumblers, and the voice of neutral people, does not impute to have been the effect of some powerful recommendation. The presumption of the influence, which the protection of men of weight has with the Judges, is so prevalent, that many who have been despoiled by an unfair decision, and who are persuaded of the justness of their cause, are afraid to appeal, if they know their opponent has great connections.

XIV. We should hope, the world is greatly mistaken in this matter. The ministers of justice, as far as they are able, and they most commonly can do this, must discharge and comply with the duties of their function in judicial phrases, and according to the words of the law; and although there may have been positive promises made, when they come to the sentence, they must consult and conform to the books of jurisprudence, and not the letters of recommendation. God defend us, however, from the serious misfortune of the protector of either party, having, or ever being able to have, influence in the seats of justice! For then we may have reason to apprehend, that to the shame of the law, the motive of the conduct of the partial Judge may be betrayed by his countenance, and that the dread of such motive being known, may be the torturer who presses out and exposes the secret, or else, that the thing may be unravelled[Pg 11] by conjectures, or proved by some transactions in the business; and these are the sort of cases, which,

after many years study, make people understand the law in a sense they never understood it before, and which, in the same instant, increases and lessens their esteem for the same authors, and causes the breath of favour to incline the balance, with which they weigh probabilities, to the side where there is the least weight in the scale. I remember that great lawyer, Alexander of the family of the Alexanders, in his treatise called Dias Geniales, says of himself, that he abandoned the profession of an advocate in disgust, from having observed in his own practice, that neither the wisdom or abilities of a counsellor, nor the goodness of a cause, were of any avail in courts, when the opposite parties were espoused by people of power.

XV. But excepting these instances, which have weight with those only, who had rather rise to the highest seats on the bench than ascend to heaven, other modes of favour in courts are trifling and of little use or consequence; but to speak the truth, we ourselves give occasion to their being thought useful and of consequence. If when a person of authority intercedes on behalf of a suitor, we give him hopes and encouragement; or if our answers to such applications,[Pg 12] are in terms which exceed what is necessary in a judicial reply; and if afterwards, when that person obtains a sentence in his favour, we seem desirous, or behave so as to make it be thought, our suffrage was a compliment to the great man who interested himself in the suitor’s behalf, in order that he should think he was obliged to us; we are the authors of this error in mankind, and the cause of the injury, which, in consequence of it, our credit suffers with the world.

XVI. This notion of the utility of recommendations, is an impediment to our business, as well as injurious to our reputation; for it is the occasion of our being interrupted with visits, and puts us under the necessity of answering letters of intercession, by which means we waste a great part of that time, which we ought to employ in study. If they knew they were taking all this pains to no purpose, they would not embarrass us with their applications, nor rob us of our time.

XVII. How then are we to act? That is easily determined; speak plain, and undeceive all the world. Let them know, that the sentence depends upon, and is ruled by the law, and not by solicitations and private friendships; that we can[Pg 13] serve no man at the expence of justice and our conscience; and that that which they call being favourable, the pretence with which they cover all their petitions, upon a practical examination of things, is a chimera; for a Judge can never shew favour, or at most the cases in which he can do it are metaphysical; even in doubtful and obscure cases, and in those where the probabilities are equal, the laws prescribe rules of equity, which we are strictly and rigorously bound to follow. Oh! but some cases are left to the discretion of the judge! It is true, but they are not for this reason to be determined by his absolute will. Prudential maxims, and rules of equity, point out the road we should pursue; and it is not lawful for us to follow any other course, either for the sake of obliging

great men or friends. When it is said, this or that is left to the will and pleasure of the Judge, it should not be understood to mean his absolute uncontrolable will, but to imply, that he is to be guided in his decision by the dictates of reason, and the principles of law. This definition, is conformable to the sense of the Latin verb arbitror, which signifies an act of the understanding, and not of the will.

XVIII. I am well aware, that objections may be made to this frank mode of acting: the first[Pg 14] is, that we may be called blunt and ill-bred; but, besides that the reflection would be unjust, it would last no longer, than till it was generally known, we had resolved to adopt this method of acting, and till it was become common and familiar among us. While there shall be but one or two judicial ministers who act in this open ingenuous manner, their candid behaviour may pass among the ignorant for want of breeding and courtesy; but if all the rest were to do the same, even the ignorant would become sensible, that what they had called want of breeding, was integrity; and they would also be convinced, that this is beneficial to them, and a great saving both of money and trouble, which are both wasted in running after, and seeking for friends and patrons, whose assistance and protection is useless to them.

XIX. The second objection is, that judicial ministers would lose a great part of the respect and homage which is now paid them, it being certain, that civilities of this sort, are not so much the result of the reverence due to the character of a Judge, as the effect of the imagined dependance on his favour. It is established upon the credit of good authors, that Epicurus did not, as it is vulgarly thought, deny the existence of the deities, but only their influence[Pg 15] or power to do good or harm; but this was sufficient, to cause the tenet to be held as atheistical in practice; for he who denies the power of the Gods, denies them adoration also. Men do not sow obsequies, but with the expectation of reaping a harvest of benefits, and dependance is the only stimulus or first mover to worship; therefore, when men come to consider the tribunal as the mere organ of the law, where every thing depends upon the intention of the legislature, and nothing upon the inclination of the Judge, the applications to the ministers of justice, would be very few and very slight.

XX. This objection would have great weight with those Judges, who desire to be regarded and addressed as deities: but do you, my Son, contemplate yourself as placed on the bench, and not on the altar; and remember, that you are not an idol destined to receive worship and offerings, but an oracle ordained to articulate truths. This is the manner in which you should explain yourself, and undeceive the world; assure the great of your respect, and your friends of your esteem; but intimate both to one and the other, that neither esteem nor respect can gain admittance into the cabinet of justice, because the fear of God, who is the door-keeper of the conscience, requires that they should remain in the antichamber.

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