THAT OUR OPPOSITES DO URGE THE CEREMONIES AS THINGS NECESSARY.

Sect. 1. This I prove, 1. From their practice; 2. From their pleading. In their practice, who seeth not that they would tie the people of God to a necessity of submitting their necks to this heavy yoke of human ceremonies? which are with more vehemency, forwardness, and strictness urged, than the weighty matters of the law of God, and the refusing whereof is far more inhibited, menaced, espied, delated, aggravated, censured, and punished, than idolatry, Popery, blasphemy, swearing, profanation of the Sabbath, murder, adultery, &c. Both preachers and people have been, and are, fined, confined, imprisoned, banished, censured, and punished so severely, that he may well say of them that which our divines say of the Papists, Hoec sua inventa Decalago anteponunt, et gravius eos-multarent qui ea violarent, quam qui divina praecepta transgrederentur.(45) Wherefore, seeing they make not only as much, but more ado, about the controverted ceremonies than about the most necessary things in religion, their practice herein makes it too, too apparent what necessity they annex to them.

Sect. 2. And if we will hearken to their pleading it tells no less; for howbeit they plead for their ceremonies, as things indifferent in their own nature, yet, when the ceremonies are considered as the ordinances of the church, they plead for them as things necessary. M. G. Powel, in the Consideration of the Arguments directed to the High Court of Parliament in behalf of the Ministers suspended and deprived (ans. 3 to arg. 16), hath these words, yea, these particulars: “Subscription, ceremonies, &c., being imposed by the church, and commanded by the magistrate, are necessary to be observed under the pain of sin.” The Bishop of Edinburgh resolves us concerning the necessity of giving obedience to the laws of the church, enacted anent the ceremonies, thus: “Where a man hath not a law, his judgment is the rule of his conscience, but where there is a law, the law must be the rule. As, for example, before that apostolical canon that forbade to eat blood or strangled things, every man might have done that which in his conscience he thought most expedient, &c., but after the making and the publication of the canon that enjoined abstinence, the same was to rule their consciences. And, therefore, after that time, albeit a man had thought in his own private judgment that to abstain from these things was not expedient, &c. yet, in that case, he ought not to have eaten, because now the will of the law, and not the judgment of his own mind, was the rule of his conscience.”(46) The Archbishop of St Andrews, to the same purpose saith, “In things indifferent we must always esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so in the eye of public authority, neither is it for private men to control public judgment, as they cannot make public constitutions, so they may not control nor disobey them, being once made, indeed authority ought to look well to this, that it prescribe nothing but rightly, appoint no rights nor orders in the church but such as may set forward godliness and piety, yet, put the case, that some be otherwise established, they must be obeyed by such as are members of that church, as long as they have the force of a constitution, &c. But thou wilt say, My conscience suffers me not to obey, for I am persuaded that such things are not right, nor appointed. I answer thee, In matters of this nature and quality the sentence of thy superiors ought to direct thee, and that is a sufficient ground to thy conscience for obeying.”(47) Thus we see that they urge the ceremonies, not only with a necessity of practice upon the outward man, but also with a necessity of opinion upon the conscience, and that merely because of the church’s determination and appointment; yea, Dr Mortoune maketh kneeling in the act of receiving the communion to be in some sort necessary in itself, for he maintaineth,(48) that though it be not essentially necessary as food, yet it is accidentally necessary as physic. Nay, some of them are yet more absurd, who plainly call the ceremonies necessary in themselves,(49) beside the constitution of the church. Others of them, who confess the ceremonies to be not only unnecessary,(50) but also inconvenient, do, notwithstanding, plead for them as things necessary. Dr Burges tells us,(51) that some of his side think that ceremonies are inconvenient, but withal he discovers to us a strange mystery brought out of the unsearchable deepness of his piercing conception, holding that such things as not only are not at all necessary in themselves,(52) but are inconvenient too, may yet be urged as necessary.

Sect. 3. The urging of these ceremonies as necessary, if there were no more, is a sufficient reason for our refusing them. “To the precepts of God (saith Balduine) nothing is to be added,(53) Deut. xii. Now God hath commanded these things which are necessary. The rites of the church are not necessary, wherefore, if the abrogation or usurpation of any rite be urged as necessary, then is an addition made to the commandment of God, which is forbidden in the word, and, by consequence, it cannot oblige me, neither should anything herein be yielded unto.” Who can purge these ceremonies in controversy among us of gross superstition, since they are urged as things necessary? But of this superstition we shall hear afterward in its proper place.

Chapter II — THE REASON TAKEN OUT OF ACTS XV. TO PROVE THE NECESSITY OF THE CEREMONIES, BECAUSE OF THE CHURCH’S APPOINTMENT, CONFUTED.

The Bishop of Edinburgh, to prove that of necessity our consciences must be ruled by the will of the law, and that it is necessary that we give obedience to the same, albeit our consciences gainsay, allegeth that apostolical canon,(54) Acts xv., for an example, just as Bellarmine maintaineth, Festorum observationem ex se indifferentem esse sed posita lege fieri necessariam(55). Hospinian, answering him, will acknowledge no necessity of the observation of feasts, except divine law could be showed for it.(56) So say we, that the ceremonies which are acknowledged by formalists to be indifferent in themselves, cannot be made necessary by the law of the church, neither doth that example of the apostolical canon make anything against us, for, according to Mr Sprint’s confession,(57) it was not the force or authority of the canon, but the reason and ground whereupon the canon was made, which caused the necessity of abstaining, and to abstain was necessary for eschewing of scandal, whether the apostles and elders had enjoined abstinence or not.(58) The reason, then, why the things prescribed in that canon are called necessary, ver. 28, is not because, being indifferent before the making and publication of the canon, they became necessary by virtue of the canon after it was made, as the Bishop teacheth, but quia tunc _ charitas exigebat, ut illa sua libertate qui ex gentibus conversi erant, propter proximi edificationem inter judeos non uterentur, sed ab ea abstinerent, saith Chemnitius.(59) This law, saith Tilen,(60) was _propter charitatem et vitandi offendiculi necessitatem ad tempus sancita. So that these things were necessary before the canon was made. Necessaria fuerunt, saith Ames,(61) antequam Apostoli quidquam de iis statuerant, non absolute, sed quatenus in iis charitas jubebat morem gerere infirmis, ut cajetanus notat. Quamobrem, saith Tilen,(62) cum charitas semper sit colenda, semper vitanda sandala. “Charity is necessary (saith Beza), even in things which are in themselves indifferent.”(63) What they can allege for the necessity of the ceremonies, from the authority and obligatory power of ecclesiastical laws, shall be answered by and by.

Chapter III — THAT THE CEREMONIES THUS IMPOSED AND URGED AS THINGS NECESSARY, DO BEREAVE US OF OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, FIRST, BECAUSE OUR PRACTICE IS ADSTRICTED.

Sect. 1. Who can blame us for standing to the defence of our Christian liberty, which we ought to defend and pretend in rebus quibusvis? saith Bucer.(64) Shall we bear the name of Christians, and yet make no great account of the liberty which hath been bought to us by the dearest drops of the precious blood of the Son of God? Sumus empti, saith Parcus:(65) non igitur nostri juris ut nos mancipemus hominum servitio: id enim manifesta cum injuria redemptoris Christi fieret: sumus liberti Christi. Magistratui autem, saith Tilen,(66) et ecclesioe proepositis, non nisi usque ad aras obtemperandum, neque ullum certamen aut periculum pro libertatis per Christum nobis partæ defensione defugiendum, siquidem mortem ipsius irritam fieri, Paulus asserit, si spiritualis servitutis jugo, nos implicari patiamur. Gal. v. 1, “Let us stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and not be entangled again with the yoke of bondage.” But that the urging of the ceremonies as necessary doth take away our Christian liberty, I will make it evident in four points.

Sect. 2. First, They are imposed with a necessity of practice. Spotswood tells us,(67) that public constitutions must be obeyed, and that private men may not disobey them, and thus is our practice adstricted in the use of things which are not at all necessary, and acknowledged gratis by the urgers to be indifferent, adstricted (I say) to one part without liberty to the other, and that by the mere authority of a human constitution, whereas Christian liberty gives us freedom both for the omission and for the observation of a thing indifferent, except some other reason do adstrict and restrain it than a bare human constitution. Chrysostome, speaking of such as are subject to bishops,(68) saith, In potestate positum est obedire vel non. Liberty in things indifferent,(69) saith Amandus Polanus, est per quam Christiani sunt liberi in usu vel abstinentia rerum adiaphorarom. Calvin, speaking of our liberty in things indifferent,(70) saith, We may eas nunc usurpare nunc omittere indifferenter, and places this liberty,(71) tam in abstinendo quam in utendo. It is marked of the rites of the ancient church,(72) that liberae fuerunt horum rituum observationes in ecclesia. And what meaneth the Apostle while he saith, “If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not, taste not, handle not, which all are to perish with the using,) after the commandments and doctrines of men?” Col. ii. 20-22. Surely he condemneth not only humana decreta de ritibus, but also subjection and obedience to such ordinances of men as take from us liberty of practice in the use of things indifferent,(73) obedience (I say) for conscience of their ordinances merely. What meaneth also that place, 1 Cor. vii. 23, “Be not ye the servants of men?” “It forbids us, (saith Paybody) to be the servants of men, that is, in wicked or superstitious actions, according to their perverse commandments or desires.”(74) If he mean of actions that are wicked or superstitious in themselves, then it followeth, that to be subject unto those ordinances, “Touch not, taste not, handle not,” is not to be the servants of men, because these actions are not wicked and superstitious in themselves. Not touching, not tasting, not handling, are in themselves indifferent. But if he mean of actions which are wicked and superstitious, in respect of circumstances, then is his restrictive gloss senseless; for we can never be the servants of men, but in such wicked and superstitious actions, if there were no more but giving obedience to such ordinances as are imposed with a necessity upon us, and that merely for conscience of the ordinance, it is enough to infect the actions with superstition, Sunt hominum servi, saith Bullinqer,(75) qui aliquid in gratiam hominum faciunt. This is nearer the truth; for to tie ourselves to the doing of anything for the will or pleasure of men, when our conscience can find no other reason for the doing of it, were indeed to make ourselves the servants of men. Far be it then from us to submit our necks to such a heavy yoke of human precepts, as would overload and undo us. Nay, we will stedfastly resist such unchristian tyranny as goeth about to spoil us of Christian liberty, taking that for certain which we find in Cyprian,(76) periculosum est in divinis rebus ut quis cedat jure suo.

Sect. 3. Two things are here replied, 1. That there is reason for adstricting of our practice in these things, because we are commanded to obey them that have the rule over us, and to submit ourselves, Heb. xiii. 17,(77) and to submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake, 1 Pet. ii. 16, and that except public constitutions must needs be obeyed, there can be no order,(78) but all shall be filled with strife and contention. Ans. 1. As touching obedience to those that are set over us, if they mean not to tyrannise over the Lord’s inheritance, 1 Pet. v. 3; and to make the commandments of God of no effect by their traditions, Mark vii. 9, they must give us leave to try their precepts by the sure will of God’s word; and when we find that they require of us anything in the worship of God which is either against or beside his written word, then modestly to refuse obedience, which is the only way for order, and shunning of strife and contention. It will be said again, that except we prove the things commanded by those who are set over us to be unlawful in themselves, we cannot be allowed to refuse obedience to their ordinances. Ans. This unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves hath been proved by us already, and shall yet again be proved in this dispute. But put the case, they were lawful in themselves, yet have we good reason for refusing them: “David thought the feeding of his body was cause sufficient to break the law of the shew-bread; Christ thought the satisfying of the disciples’ hunger to be cause sufficient to break the ceremony of the Sabbath. He thought, also, that the healing of the lepers’ bodies was a just excuse to break the law that forbade the touching of them; much more, then, may we think now in our estimation, that the feeding of other men’s souls, the satisfying of our own consciences, together with the consciences of other men, and the healing of men’s superstition and spiritual leprosy, are causes sufficient to break the law of the ceremonies and of the cross, which are not God’s but men’s,” saith Parker.(79) 2. As touching submission or subjection, we say with Dr Field,(80) that subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not, and even when our consciences suffer us not to obey, yet still we submit and subject ourselves, and neither do nor shall (I trust) show any the least contempt of authority.

Sect. 4. Secondly, It is replied, that our Christian liberty is not taken away when practice is restrained, because conscience is still left free. “The Christian liberty (saith Paybody(81)), is not taken away by the necessity of doing a thing indifferent, or not doing, but only by that necessity which takes away the opinion or persuasion of its indifferency,” So saith Dr Burges,(82) “That the ceremonies in question are ordained to be used necessarily, though the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to God, be left free.” Ans. 1. Who doubts of this, that liberty of practice may be restrained in the use of things which are in themselves indifferent? But, yet, if the bare authority of an ecclesiastical law, without any other reason than the will and pleasure of men, be made to restrain practice, then is Christian liberty taken away. Junius saith,(83) that externum opus ligatur from the use of things indifferent, when the conscience is not bound; but in that same place he showeth, that the outward action is bound and restrained only quo usque circumstantiae ob quas necessitas imperata est, se extendunt. So that it is not the authority of an ecclesiastical law, but the occasion and ground of it, which adstricts the practice when the conscience is left free. 2. When the authority of the church’s constitution is obtruded to bind and restrain the practice of Christians in the use of things indifferent, they are bereaved of their liberty, as well as if an opinion of necessity were borne in upon their consciences. Therefore we see when the Apostle, 1 Cor. vii., gives liberty of marriage, he doth not only leave the conscience free in its judgment of the lawfulness of marriage, but also give liberty of practice to marry or not to marry. And Col. ii. 21, when he giveth instances of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty, he saith not, you must think that you may not touch, &c., but “touch not,” &c., telling us, that when the practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling, by the ordinances of men, then is Christian liberty spoiled, though the conscience be left free. Camero, speaking of the servitude which is opposed to Christian liberty, saith,(84) that it is either animi servitus, or corporis servitus. Then if the outward man be brought in bondage, this makes up spiritual thraldom, though there be no more. But, 3. The ceremonies are imposed with an opinion of necessity upon the conscience itself, for proof whereof I proceed to the next point.

Chapter IV — THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A SECOND REASON, NAMELY, BECAUSE CONSCIENCE ITSELF IS BOUND AND ADSTRICTED.

Sect. 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us,(85) that the will of the law must be the rule of our conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience,(86) and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies,(87) not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat.(88) And shall they who call themselves the apostles’ successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of God? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants,(89) Nullam vim ipsorum conscientiis illatum iri. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.