TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.

The only version of the entire works of Plato, which has appeared in the English language, is that published by Taylor; in which nine of the Dialogues previously translated by Floyer Sydenham are introduced. Taylor’s portion of the work is far from correct, and betrays an imperfect knowledge of Greek: that by Sydenham is much better, and evidently the work of a scholar, but in many instances, and those chiefly where difficulties present themselves, he obscures his author’s meaning by too great amplification. Translations of several detached Dialogues have appeared at various times, but of those which have fallen into my hands none appear to me deserving of notice, with the exception of a little volume containing the Phædrus, Lysis, and Protagoras, by Mr. J. Wright, of Trinity College, Cambridge, the production of a promising scholar.

In the volume now offered to the public, I have endeavoured to keep as closely to the original as the idioms of the two languages would allow.

viiiIn the introduction to each Dialogue I have contented myself with giving a brief outline of the arguments; sufficient, I trust, to enable a reader not familiar with the rigid dialectics of Plato to follow the chain of his reasoning, and catch the points at which he so frequently diverges from, and again returns to, the main subject of each Dialogue.

The editions which have been made use of are those of Bekker, Ast, and Stallbaum, though with very few exceptions the readings of the latter have been adopted. The division into sections, according to the London edition of Bekker, has been retained, because the arrangement is convenient, and it is believed that that edition is more generally to be met with in this country than any other.

Oxford, Nov. 28, 1848.

Page 428. § 114, l. 6, for objects, both, read both objects.

INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

Two charges were brought against Socrates, one, that he did not believe in the gods received by the state, the other, that he corrupted the Athenian youth by teaching them not to believe.

Plato, who was present at the trial, probably gives us the very arguments employed by the accused on that occasion. Socrates disdained to have recourse to the usual methods adopted by the popular orators of the day to secure an acquittal; and, having devoted his whole life to the search after and the inculcation of religious, philosophical, and moral truth, resolved to bear himself in this extremity in a manner consistent with his established character, and to take his stand on his own integrity and innocence, utterly uninfluenced by that imaginary evil, death. From this cause it is that his defence is so little artificial. In his discussions with others, on whatever subject, it was his constant habit to keep his opponents to the question before them, and he would never suffer them to evade it, but by a connected series of the most subtle questions or arguments compelled them to retract any erroneous opinion they might have advanced: whereas, in defending himself, he never once fairly grapples with either of the charges brought

against him. With regard to the first accusation, that he did not believe in the established religion, he neither confesses nor denies it, but shews that he had in some instances conformed to the religious customs of his country, and that he did believe 2in God, so much so indeed that even if they would acquit him on condition of his abandoning his practice of teaching others, he could not consent to such terms, but must persevere in fulfilling the mission on which the Deity had sent him, for that he feared God rather than man. With reference to the second charge which he meets first, by his usual method of a brief but close cross-examination of his accuser Melitus, he brings him to this dilemma, that he must either charge him with corrupting the youth designedly, which would be absurd, or with doing so undesignedly, for which he could not be liable to punishment.

The Defence itself properly ends with the twenty-fourth section. The second division to the twenty-ninth section relates only to the sentence which ought to be passed on him. And in the third and concluding part, with a dignity and fulness of hope worthy even of a Christian, he expresses his belief that the death to which he is going is only a passage to a better and a happier life.

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

I know not, O Athenians, how far you have been influenced by my accusers: for my part, in listening to them I almost forgot myself, so plausible were their arguments: however, so to speak, they have said nothing true. But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially, that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should be deceived by me, as being eloquent in speech. For that they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact, when I shall shew that I am not by any means eloquent, this seemed to me the most shameless thing in them, unless indeed they call him eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they mean this, then I would allow that I am an orator, but not after their fashion: for they, as I affirm, have said nothing true; but from me you shall hear the whole truth. Not indeed, Athenians, arguments highly wrought, as theirs were, with choice phrases and expressions, nor adorned, but you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation, in such words as first present themselves. For I am confident

that what I say will be just, and let none of you expect otherwise: for surely it would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth with a got up speech. Above all things therefore I beg and implore this of you, O Athenians, if you hear me defending myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. For the case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice, though more than seventy years old; I am therefore utterly a stranger to the language here. As, then, if I were really a stranger, you would have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had been educated, so now I ask this of you as an act of justice, as it appears to me, to 4disregard the manner of my speech, for perhaps it may be somewhat worse, and perhaps better, and to consider this only, and to give your attention to this, whether I speak what is just or not; for this is the virtue of a judge, but of an orator to

speak the truth.

2. First then, O Athenians, I am right in defending myself against the first false accusations alleged against me, and my first accusers, and then against the latest accusations, and the latest accusers. For many have been accusers of me to you, and for many years, who have asserted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party, although they too are formidable; but those are still more formidable, Athenians, who laying hold of many of you from childhood, have persuaded you, and accused me of what is not true:—“that there is one Socrates, a wise man, who occupies himself about celestial matters, and has explored every thing under the earth, and makes the worse appear the better reason.” Those, O Athenians, who have spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers: for they who hear them think that such as search into these things do not believe that there are gods. In the next place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me now for a long time; moreover they said these things to you at that time of life in which you were most

credulous, when you were boys and some of you youths, and they accused me altogether in my absence, when there was no one to defend me. But the most unreasonable thing of all is, that it is not possible to learn and mention their names, except that one of them happens to be a comic poet[1]. Such, however, as influenced by envy and calumny have persuaded you, and those who, being themselves persuaded, have persuaded others, all these are most difficult to deal with; for it is not possible to bring any of them forward here, nor to confute any; but it is altogether necessary, to fight as it were with a shadow, in making my defence, and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider, therefore, as I have said, that my accusers are twofold, some who have lately accused me, and others long since, whom I have made mention of; and believe that I ought to defend myself against these first; for you heard them accusing me first, and much more than these last.

Well. I must make my defence then, O Athenians, and 5endeavour in this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you have long entertained. I wish, indeed, it might be so, if it were at all better both for you and me, and that in making my defence I could effect something more advantageous still: I think however that it will be difficult, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. Nevertheless let this turn out as may be pleasing to God, I must obey the law, and make my defence.

3. Let us then repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen, and relying on which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. What then do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. “Socrates acts wickedly, and is criminally curious in searching into things under the earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear the better cause, and in teaching these same things to others.” Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, one Socrates there carried about, saying that he walks in the air, and acting many other buffooneries, of which I understand nothing whatever. Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science, if there be any one skilled in such things, only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge of this kind; but I say it, O Athenians, because I have nothing to do with such matters. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of this, and require you to inform and tell each

other, as many of you as have ever heard me conversing; and there are many such among you. Therefore tell each other, if any one of you has ever heard me conversing little or much on such subjects. And from this you will know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are of a similar nature.

4. However not one of these things is true; nor, if you have heard from any one that I attempt to teach men, and require payment, is this true. Though this indeed appears to me to be an honourable thing, if one should be able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, O Athenians, is able, by going through the several cities, to persuade the young men, who can attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow citizens as they please, to abandon their fellow citizens and associate with them, giving them money and thanks besides. There is also another 6wise man here, a Parian, who I hear is staying in the city. For I happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others together, I mean Callias, son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, “Callias,” I said, “if your two sons were colts or calves, we should have had to choose a master for them and hire a person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their nature:

and he would have been a groom or an agricultural labourer. But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this, since you have sons. Is there any one,” I said, “or not?” “Certainly,” he answered. “Who is he?” said I, “and whence does he come? and on what terms does he teach?” He replied, “Evenus the Parian, Socrates, for five minæ.” And I deemed Evenus happy, if he really possesses this art, and teaches so admirably. And I too should think highly of myself and be very proud, if I possessed this knowledge; but I possess it not, O Athenians.

5. Perhaps, one of you may now object: “But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more than others, such a report and story would never have got abroad, unless you had done something different from what most men do. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass a hasty judgment on you.” He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavour to shew you what it is that has occasioned me this character and imputation. Listen then: to some of you perhaps I shall appear to jest, yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this character through nothing else than a certain wisdom. Of what kind, then, is this wisdom? Perhaps it is merely human wisdom. For in this, in truth I appear to be wise. They probably, whom I just now mentioned, possessed a wisdom more than human, otherwise I know not what to say about it; for I am not acquainted with it, and whosoever says I am, speaks falsely and for the

purpose of calumniating me. But, O Athenians, do not cry out against me, even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. For the account which I am going to give you, is not my own, but I shall refer to an authority whom 7you will deem worthy of credit. For I shall adduce to you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom, if I have any, and of what it is. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth, and the associate of most of you; he accompanied you in your late exile and returned with you. You know, then, what kind of a man Chærepho was, how earnest in whatever he undertook. Having once gone to Delphi, he ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle, (and, as I said, O Athenians, do not cry out,) for he asked if there was any one wiser than me. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser: and of this, his brother here will give you proofs, since he himself is dead.

6. Consider then why I mention these things: it is because I am going to shew you whence the calumny against me arose. For when I heard this, I reasoned thus with myself, What does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either much or little. What then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he cannot do. And for a long time, I was in doubt what he meant; afterwards with considerable difficulty I had recourse to the following method of searching out his meaning. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise, thinking that there, if any where, I should confute the oracle, and shew in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I, though you affirmed that I was the wisest. Having then examined this man, (for there is no occasion to mention his name, he was however one of our great politicians, in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe, O Athenians,) having fallen into conversation with him, this man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of most

other men, and especially in his own opinion, though in fact he was not so. I thereupon endeavoured to shew him that he fancied himself to be wise, but really was not. Hence I became odious both to him, and to many others who were present. When I left him, I reasoned thus with myself, I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appear to know any thing great and good: but he fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing, whereas I, as I do not know any thing, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know. After that I went to another who was thought to 8be wiser than the former, and formed the very same opinion. Hence I became odious to him and to many others.

7. After this I went to others in turn, perceiving indeed and grieving and alarmed that I was making myself odious; however it appeared necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment, and that in order to discover its meaning, I must go to all who had the reputation of possessing any knowledge. And by the dog, O Athenians, for I must tell you the truth, I came to some such conclusion as this: those who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient, in my researches in obedience to the god, and others who were considered inferior, more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. But I must relate to you my wandering, and the labours which I underwent, in order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. For after the politicians I went to the poets as well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others, expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than them. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems, which appeared to me most elaborately finished, I questioned them as to their meaning, that at the same time I

might learn something from them. I am ashamed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; however it must be told. For, in a word, almost all who were present could have given a better account of them than those by whom they had been composed. I soon discovered this, therefore, with regard to the poets, that they do not effect their object by wisdom, but by a certain natural inspiration and under the influence of enthusiasm like prophets and seers; for these also say many fine things, but they understand nothing that they say. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner: and at the same time I perceived that they considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they were not. I left them, therefore, under the persuasion that I was superior to them, in the same way that I was to the politicians.

8. At last, therefore, I went to the artizans. For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely any thing, but I was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. And in this I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this respect they were wiser than me. But, O Athenians, even the best workmen appeared to me to 9have fallen into the same error as the poets: for each, because he excelled in the practice of his art, thought that he was very wise in other most important matters, and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they really possessed. I therefore asked myself in behalf of the oracle, whether I should prefer to continue as I am, possessing none either of their wisdom or their ignorance, or to have both as they have. I answered, therefore, to myself and to the oracle, that it was better for me to continue as I am.